4. Summary and conclusions

15 projects focused on estimating civilian deaths have been reviewed, taking a variety of approaches, differing in scope, methodology, and degree of completeness. Although those that have reported outcomes tend to report somewhat different totals, this is entirely understandable as a function of the different scope, methodology, and completeness of each respective project. The important thing to note is that there is very little overall inconsistency. Nothing in one project contradicts or casts doubt on data from any other project. All projects must be viewed as incomplete “snapshots” of different grain. They generally reinforce rather than contradict one another. None so far has ventured to extrapolate from limited evidence to a (dubious) conclusion about the entire conflict. All recognize that more evidence remains to be gathered, but based on what is so far known, they provide converging evidence that the total number of civilians killed in the conflict is well above 5,000.

The fact that the various researchers are largely independent of one another, and have initiated their work without detailed collaboration or co-ordination, can be seen as both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that the total enterprise does not fail if any one project fails. The disadvantage is, of course, dissipation of resource and duplication of effort.

Considerations that are often felt to be of importance in evaluating projects of this sort are (a) the track record of the researchers; and (b) their political orientation. Our view is that these considerations are secondary. The primary criterion on which projects of this sort should be evaluated is the quality and degree of disclosure of their published materials (methodology, rationale, sources). The more explicit, detailed and public the project, the less relevant the background of the researcher becomes to any judgement of the merit of the work. In general, bias that is openly stated and recognized is preferable to that which is hidden in self-professed, and in truth perhaps unattainable, “neutrality”. However, what ultimately matters is the quality of the work.

Our main plea to some of our fellow researchers is, therefore, to publish as much detail as possible, including all sources consulted, the methodologies used, and a breakdown of deaths according to place and date. We also consider it good practice to publish the names and brief vitae of all main project personnel, together with an email address to which comments and questions can be directed.

We ask the press and media to assist this process by providing full sourcing for projects they mention, including contact details. The table below shows where such sourcing remains deficient.

We end with two questions. (1) Are these projects worthwhile? And (2) Why have they been left to relatively small unofficial organisations, in the main?

(1) Are the projects worthwhile?

These projects have a short-term and a long-term value. The short-term value is to provide information which would assist anyone planning to provide support or reparation to the families of those killed. This is a humanitarian imperative about which there can be no real disagreement, whatever one’s view of the arguments for going to war. The long-term value is in providing part of the full estimate of the cost of this war, to help evaluate the claims from the Pentagon that their war fighting strategies take increasingly few civilian lives, and to provide an empirical foundation for assessing the war in moral, socio-political and historical contexts. As soon as a single named death is confirmed, the short-term value can begin to be realised. Obviously, the long-term value is best gained when a relatively complete picture emerges. That is why both fine-grained and “broad-spectrum” projects are needed.

(2) Why have they been left to marginal players?

The single most notable fact about all this work is the almost complete absence of any official or semi-official agency from the scene, the abortive Swiss Foreign Ministry attempt notwithstanding. No project funded by any government has been announced since conquest was declared, and there appears to be no involvement of any supra-national agencies such as the UN. Considering the importance of this work, this is an astonishing state of affairs. It is, of course, possible that unpublicised work is under way - but we can think of no justifiable reason why governments and supra-national agencies should undertake such work covertly. On balance our judgement is that the work is just not being done, and that the parties most closely involved just don't want to know.

On May 1st 2003, to wide global indifference, the UN’s Commission on Human Security published its final report, entitled “Human Security Now”. This report is a scathing indictment of the low priority given by world powers to the needs and rights of civilians before, during, and after conflict. Chapter 4 of this report is entitled “Recovering from Violent Conflict”. On page 65 of that chapter the following is said:

“Justice and reconciliation programmes in post-conflict situations center on two strategies. The first, relating to the events that occurred in the conflict phase, focuses on establishing the truth of what happened, upholding justice for the victims and punishing the perpetrators. The second focuses on establishing the rule of law, developing a human rights regime and strengthening judicial systems.”

All the projects we have described in this review are devoted to the key aim of “establishing the truth of what happened”. That this is not a priority for the US or UK administrations shows just how far our own nations are from promoting or even upholding the ideals of Human Security.

John Sloboda and Hamit Dardagan - June 12th 2003